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THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE EXERCISE OF
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION BY THE CHEROKEE
SUPREME COURT: 1823-1835
J. MATTHEW MARTIN*

INTRODUCTION

Following independence, the nascent American republic grappled
almost immediately with the status of the Indian Tribes and its own
insatiable hunger for land. John Gast's "American Progress," that
19th Century angelic archetype of hemispheric American imperialism,
"appeared as an angel of another sort" to Native Americans.' Ironically, at the very moment that popular democracy began its explosive
rise, not only as a doctrine but also as a "style of politics," the United
States "engorged" Indian lands in an insatiable westward encroachment, subjugating, stealing, and slaying.2
The victors then pushed the vanquished aside. Those who regretted
the violence wished the process of dispossession to proceed as painlessly as possible. Jefferson captured this humanitarian impulse in

comments to a gathering of Native Americans at the end of his presidency: 'We wish you to live in peace, to increase in numbers . . . In
time you will be as we are:3 you will become one people with us: your
blood will mix with ours.'

That the fledgling democracy would crush indigenous peoples
seemed to outrage only a small minority of American citizens.' Instead, "against the background of Americans' self-perceived vocation
as torchbearers of republicanism and democracy-at a time when democracy was still unique to their own country and the world still
* Associate Judge, The Cherokee Court and Adjunct Professor of Law, UNC-School of
Law. This paper also serves as a Masters Thesis for the Judicial Studies Program at the University of Nevada-Reno. Thanks to James Richardson, Ph.D., Elizabeth Francis, Ph.D., Committee
Chair, Theda Perdue, Ph.D., the Honorable Stacy Leeds, John D. Loftin, J.D., Ph.D. and the late
Elmer Rusco, Ph.D. for all of their assistance and encouragement. Thanks also to Catherine S.
Martin and the Honorable Harry C. Martin as well as the library staffs of the University of
North Carolina, the UNC School of Law, UNC-Asheville, Western Carolina University and the
Tennessee State Archives.
1. FELIPE FERNANDEZ-ARMESTO, MILLENNIUM: A HISTORY OF THE LAST THOUSAND
YEARS 360-61 (1995).

2. Id. at 359-61.
3. MICHAEL H. HUNT,THE
4. Id. at 15.
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seemed far from safe for republicanism-the apparent paradox made
perfect sense."5
Conquest, of both nature and the natives within it, thus served as a
feature of the "moral unity of Atlantic civilization." 6 The will to dominate received legitimacy from "faith in a progressive human drama to
be played out on the North American continent."' 7 Dominance by
conquest rooted itself in 19th Century American consciousness. 8 But
regardless of the moral foundations of the new nation and its Manifest
Destiny, American Indians fought vigorously in various ways, including passive resistance, negotiation, cultural assimilation and open
warfare. 9
Governmental efforts to remove South Eastern Indians beyond the
Mississippi River in the 1820's and 1830's can be seen first as a natural
consequence of the concept of conquest, coalescing into an organized
policy response to the clamor of the frontier. 10 During the 19th Century, American Indians were never fully conquered despite the dedication of the full resources of the new American republic to their
subjugation, including what can only be described as germ warfare,
ethnic cleansing and genocide. 1
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court turned to the concept of dominance by conquest when pressed to explain the legalities of land titles
regarding tracts occupied by American Indians in a way that the increasingly dominant culture could understand. 2 In a remarkably
open decisional process, Chief Justice Marshall admitted that the
Court was, in the absence of Constitutional direction, making up the
law as it went along:
That law which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the rela-

tions between the conqueror and conquered, was incapable of application to a people under such circumstances. The resort to some new
and different rule, better adapted to the actual state of things, was
unavoidable. 3

These two sentences, perhaps more than any others, accurately describe the development of Federal Indian Law over the past two
centuries. 14
5. FERNANDEz-ARMESTO, supra note 1, at 359.

6. Id. at 360.
7. Hurr, supra note 3, at 34.
8. Id. at 15.
9. Id. at 15, 34.
10. Id. at 15-16.
11. Id. at 16.
12. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823) ("Title by conquest is acquired
and maintained by force.").
13. Id. at 591.
14. See, e.g. David H. Getches, Conquering the CulturalFrontier: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1996) ("[O]pinions in this field
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The notable resilience of American Indians, and indeed their very
survival, often leads to confusions of jurisprudence at the federal level
as Congress and the Supreme Court struggle to explain exactly their
legal status, the "actual state of things" or "the current state of affairs"
implicit within our Constitutional framework.1 5 Indian people survived various attempts at extirpation' 6 and they persist-now fully
American, but also situated uniquely within the fabric of the
Republic. 7
The decades following the removal of many of the South Eastern
Indians to Arkansas and what would become Oklahoma were marked
by struggles to survive and adapt both to a rapidly changing world and
to Congressional policies that sought to accomplish Jefferson's dream
of assimilation.' 8 Congressional policy intended to eradicate "Indianess" by forcing boarding school education to inculcate the dominant
culture, by eliminating Indian lands and by encouraging the mixing of
blood.1 9 Efforts to eradicate established Tribal systems of justice continued as well.2" If Ex Parte Crow Dog reflected the Supreme Court's
late 19th Century desire to wash its hands of Tribal Court issues2 1,
then Talton v. Mayes demonstrated, before the end of the 19th Century, that questions surrounding Tribal Court jurisdiction would continue nonetheless to reach the high Court.2 2 The Cherokee Nation's
judicial branch closed as a result of the implementation of the Curtis
3
Act 2 in 1898.24
have not posited an original state of affairs that can subsequently be altered only by explicit
legislation, but have rather sought to discern what the current state of affairs ought to be by
taking into account all legislation, and the congressional 'expectations' that it reflects, down to
the present day."(quoting April 4, 1990 Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., regarding Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), in Papers of Justice
Thurgood Marshall (reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress))).
15. "The United States has always recognized tribal sovereignty but has swung between
periods when that recognition was strong and periods in which the federal government sought to
limit or even abolish tribal sovereignty. This vacillation has led to conflicting lines of precedent
and to limitations on tribal sovereignty resulting from past intrusions." FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1376 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender
2005) (1941); But see Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Same Sex Marriage,Indian Tribes and the Constitution, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 53, 63 (2006)("The text [of the Constitution] does not appear to
recognize tribal sovereignty except in an implicit fashion, although the evidence of that recognition is as close to conclusive as possible.").
16. HurT, supra note 3, at 17.
17. Id. at 35.
18. Id. at 15.
19. RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRrrS 180 (1975). See also COHEN, supra note
15, at 81-82.
20. Id. at 175-76.
21. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
22. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
23. Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 496 (1898).
24. STRICKLAND, supra note 19, at 176.
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During the first few decades of the 20th Century, for most American Indians, tribal governmental structures, including notions of jurisprudence, necessarily took a back seat to a more desperate concern:
survival.25 In 1917, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs was "finally
able to 26declare that more Indians were being born than were
dying[.],
Undoubtedly, traditional methods of problem solving continueddisputes had to be addressed. The early 20th Century saw the renaissance of the Navajo Courts-in which ancient, venerable institutions
evolved into recognizably modern tribunals, paving the way for other
Tribal Courts.27 This development, coupled with the evolution of a
new, late 20th Century Congressional policy towards American Indians - neither fully enlightened nor even benign, but thankfully no
longer openly genocidal - led to new pressures for the Supreme
Court.28 These pressures include how to define the jurisdiction of the
various Indian Tribes over Indian Country and the roles of the Tribal
Courts in exercising that jurisdiction. 9
In a series of cases beginning in 1978 with Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe3° , the Supreme Court repeatedly returned to the foundation laid by Chief Justice Marshall, reiterating the notion that "the
tribes were incorporated into the territory of the United States and
accepted the protection of the Federal Government-.. ."31 Therefore,
the logic went, the Tribes "necessarily lost some of the sovereign powers they had previously exercised."32
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited
character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to
complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their
existing primeval powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute,
or by implica33
tion as a necessary result of their dependent status.
This analysis led the Supreme Court to hold that Tribal judicial power
is constrained to the extent that it must be consistent with the Tribe's
dependent status. 4
25. HuNT, supra note 3, at 17.
26. COHEN, supra note 15, at 1377.
27. DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL CHANGE AND CULTURAL CONTINUITY AMONG NATIVE
NATIONS 93 (2007).
28. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 23 (1987).
29. COHEN, supra note 15, at 756-57.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (citations omitted).

34. Id.
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Today "dependent status" remains a shifting term in assessing the
sovereignty of the Indian Nations." For example, when the Navajo
Tribal Courts punish Tribal members for violating the Tribe's criminal
laws, the Tribal Courts are exercising a "part of the Navajo's primeval
sovereignty, [which] has never been taken away from them, either explicitly or implicitly -. .. 36
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also determined that

Tribal Courts may not attach criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian citizens of the United States.3 7 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
broadly surveyed treaties between the various Indian Nations and the
United States, analyzed Congressional policy and determined that

prosecution of non-Indian citizens is inconsistent with dependent sovereign status.38 Following Oliphant,the Court and the Congress have
struggled with each other over the question of whether Tribal Courts
may prosecute non-Tribal member Indians.3 9
Since 1978, Oliphant and its progeny have created a thirty year long

schism during which the Supreme Court has constrained the exercise

of Tribal sovereignty.4" This is, arguably, contrary to Congressional

policy, in that it restricts the jurisdiction of Tribal justice systems in

criminal and civil cases, as well as administrative matters. 4 1 This extraordinary series of cases creates a situation whereby Tribal Courts

have general subject matter jurisdiction over their territory, but restricted personal jurisdiction, particularly in criminal cases.42 The ultimate effect of this federal common law created by the Supreme Court
has been the evolution of a deadly paradox-a recognition of territo-

35. The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of
any other two people in existence. In the general, nations not owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other. The term foreign nation is, with strict propriety,
applicable by either to the other. But the relation of the Indians to the United States
is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831).
36. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328.
37. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209-210.
38. Id. at 208.
39. Compare Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over anyone other than a Tribal member was inconsistent with Tribal dependent status)
with United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (Congress may modify federal common law by
removing restrictions on Tribal inherent authority without vesting the Tribes with federal power)
and 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2007) (as modified with the Duro fix).
40. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Lara, 541 U.S. 193; Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., _ U.S. _, 128 S.Ct. 2709, 171 L. Ed. 2d 457 (2008).
41. See STRICKLAND, supra note 19, at 176; see also, e.g. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Nevada, 533 U.S. 353; Plains Commerce Bank, _

U.S. _,

128 S. Ct. 2709, 171 L. Ed. 2d 457.

42. Montana, 450 U.S. 544.
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ries that are sovereign yet effectively lawless, at least for some
individuals.4 3

An almost annual uncertainty prevails, as practitioners and jurists in
Indian Country await the latest pronouncements from the Supreme
Court. At least in part, the Supreme Court has been unable to formulate a reliable set of assumptions as to what Tribal Court actions are
consistent with a particular Tribe's dependent status.4 4 All of this judicial wrangling results from the faulty premise of Oliphant that the
Indian Nations did not historically exercise jurisdiction, as it is understood in the modern context, over white citizens of the United
States.45

The Supreme Court of the United States has missed an opportunity
to evaluate "the actual state of things" as articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall.46 Because neither Oliphant nor its progeny reference the
operation of the Cherokee Supreme Court from 1823-1835, 47 the

Court has understood neither the weight nor significance of Tribal
Court jurisprudence in the early 19th Century.48 This has resulted in a
failure by the Supreme Court to appreciate the precedents of early
19th Century Tribal Courts with regard to the calculations of
49
Oliphant.
The Cherokee Supreme Court was created by the Cherokee Nation's laws and incorporated later into its 1827 Constitution. 50 The
Cherokee Supreme Court lent sophisticated stability to the Nation's
"social order [which] was more advanced than that of many of the

43. Amnesty Int'l USA, Maze of Injustice: The Failureto Protect Indigenous Women from
Sexual Violence in the USA (2007), http://www.amnestyusa.orglviolence-against-women/maze-ofinjustice/the-report/page.do?id=1021167.
44. One commentator has suggested that a cause of the Supreme Court's inability to hew a
straight line on jurisdictional issues in Indian Country is because the Court itself, as the slowest
branch of the Federal government, continues to examine historical events through a policy lens
of Jeffersonian assimilation, not through the more modern Congressional policy framework. Kevin Sobel-Read, Still Punching Holes in Tribal Sovereignty: How Modem Supreme Court Policy
is to Indian Jurisdiction what Allotment was to Tribal Land (Fall 2007) (unpublished paper, on
file with author).
45. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
46. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591.
47. The Supreme Court did look at the original Choctaw Tribal Court. See Oliphant, 214
U.S. at 197-199. However, one of the source materials relied upon for support by the majority in
Oliphant is the Opinion of the Attorney General. See also 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 174, 15-16 (1853)
(concludes that the Choctaw and Chickasaw lacked jurisdiction over non-Indians but nevertheless construes the so called Treaty of New Echota to contain "the most unequivocal recognition
of the right of persons not Cherokees to be aggregated to the Cherokee nation, and subject to its
laws"). This portion is unmentioned in the opinion. One of Oliphant's many flaws is a lack of
complete resort to the full historical record.
48. Oliphant, 214 U.S. at 197-199.
49. Plains Commerce Bank,
U.S. _, 128 S.Ct. at 2719, 171 L.Ed. 2d at 471.
50. LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 89-90 (spec. ed., Legal Classics Library 1995)
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rude white settlements around [it]." 5 1 Other than treaties, the decisional history of the work of the Cherokee Supreme Court and its
constituent lower Courts is the only direct indicator, the only substantive evidence, of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, as we understand it in the modern context, by an Indian Tribe prior to the removal
of most South Eastern Tribes to the Indian Territories. An analysis of
the nature and exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the Cherokee Supreme Court prior to removal thus provides compelling evidence,
within a formalistic rubric familiar to the modern lawyer or jurist, of
the sovereign judicial power retained by the Cherokees to this day.5 2
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), the Supreme Court of the
United States determined that the various Indian Nations were "dependent sovereign nations."5 3 But at the very time Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia was written, the Choctaw and Cherokee Court systems exemplified the actual exercise of constitutional judicial power by a dependent Tribal sovereign.5 4 Thus, when the Supreme Court today
investigates what jurisdictional powers, consistent with their status as
dependent sovereign nations, have been retained by the various
Tribes-Tribes in general, Cherokees in particular-it should look to
the example of the Cherokee Judges of the early 19th Century. It has
not.5 5
The best evidence of retained Tribal sovereignty involving the judicial power is not a survey of treaties (honored more in the breach than
act by the United States government), but rather the historical record
of the actual exercise of judicial power by the Tribal Courts themselves. Careful analysis of this exercise of judicial authority discloses
that the Cherokee Supreme Court possessed all of the attributes of
complete criminal jurisdiction as we understand it today. 56 Analysis
claims
of the "actual state of things '57 leads inexorably to reasonable
58
about "what the current state of affairs ought to be."
This paper serves as an historical survey of all criminal appeals adjudicated by the Cherokee Supreme Court during its existence prior
to removal (1823-1835). It pays particular attention to the type of
51. William C. McLoughlin, Thomas Jefferson and the Beginning of Cherokee Nationalism,
1806 to 1809, 32 THE WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY, 547 (Oct., 1975).

52. This does not pre-suppose that the banging of the gavel in the Tribal Supreme Court on
October 9, 1823 constituted the beginning of Cherokee law, only that antecedents might be more
accessible to anthropologists, historians and ethnographers rather than lawyers. For an excellent
analysis of aboriginal Cherokee law, see JOHN PHILLIP REID, A LAW OF BLOOD: THE PRIMITIVE
LAW OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, (New York University Press 1970).

53. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
54. Id. at 2.
55. See Oliphant, 214 U.S. at 196.
56. LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 90.

57. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591.
58. Id.
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case, nature of the prosecution, result and, most importantly, aspects
of the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction. Equally important, the paper reviews other criminal cases tried before the lower Tribal Courts,
of which there is a record, to illustrate the nature and circumstances
within which the Cherokee Nation's judicial branch operated.
Careful analysis of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the Cherokee Supreme Court and lower Courts from 1823 to 1835 demonstrates the extent of those Courts' retained primeval power, and
clearly shows that such authority is the equivalent of Chief Justice
Marshall's "actual state of things."59 As evidenced by its operation of
its own judicial systems, as well as by approving actions of agents of
the United States, the Cherokee Nation's exercise of criminal jurisdiction during the existence of its original Supreme Court remained consistent with the Cherokees' dependent status. Prior to removal, the
Cherokee Courts exercised full criminal jurisdiction historically consistent with the dependent status of the Cherokee Court system.
I.

"A

RECORD BOOK OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE CHEROKEE NATION-" '60 AND THE
CHEROKEE PHOENIX6 1 .

In an attempt to place into context the Court's exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, this paper examines certain primary historical documents. The minute book of the Clerk of the Cherokee Supreme
Court, mislabeled by historical scholars as the "docket" of the Cherokee Supreme Court, is the primary source for the study of the Court's
exercise of criminal jurisdiction.62 The manuscript itself is titled "A
Record Book of the Proceedings of the Supreme Court of the Cherokee Nation."6 3 I shall refer to the document as the "Court Minute
Book."
The manuscript contains a record of the work of the Cherokee Supreme Court for twelve years: 1823 to 1835.64 The organization and
content of the Court Minute Book is consistent with the November 8,

1822 law enacted by the Cherokee National Council65 : "[t]hat the
Judges of the District Courts, shall keep a record of the proceedings of
59. Id.
60. A Record Book of the Proceedings of the Supreme Court of the Cherokee Nation
(unpublished document, on file with University of Tennessee Institute of Museum and Library
Services) [hereinafter Court Minute Book].
61. CHEROKEE PHOENIX (New Echota).
62. THEDA PERDUE, CHEROKEE WOMEN: GENDER AND CULTURE CHANGE, 1700 TO 1835
231 n.87 (1998).
63. Court Minute Book, supra note 60.
64. Id.
65. LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 26.
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all causes, evidences and decisions ... ."' The Court Minute Book
was written by various hands in thick, black ink.67 Although its pages
are not all filled in, the writing typically is cramped, generally suggesting frugality.68 Some of the entries are boldly written, with such
effusion that the ink bled into the opposite pages.6 9
The Court Minute Book is located in the repository of the Tennessee State Archives in Nashville, Tennessee. It is remarkable and a gift
to the Cherokee people and scholars that the Court Minute Book has
survived removal and the "Trail of Tears," when so much else from the
Cherokee Nation was lost.
The manuscript was apparently removed to Oklahoma with the papers of Principal Chief John Ross. According to Malone, Mrs. Penelope J. Allen of Chattanooga, Tennessee obtained the manuscript in a
collection of "many valuable items" from Robert Ross, a grandson of
John Ross.7 0 Mrs. Allen subsequently sold the materials to the State
of Tennessee for permanent preservation in the Tennessee State
Archives.7
No Tribe has been more studied than the Cherokees. Previous
scholars have reviewed the actions of the Cherokee Supreme Court,
primarily in an attempt to document the Cherokees' remarkable
transformation of their culture from a clan-based society to a society
grounded in the modern concept of rule of law as they sought to retain
territory and avoid removal.7 2 Historians have, however, juxtaposed
the Court's work with the fast moving legal and political events ongoing in both the state and federal courts of the time, as well as in state
and federal governments.73 Both Malone and Strickland have categorized the decisions of the Cherokee Supreme Court.7 4 No one has yet
definitively investigated the Court's exercise of its criminal
jurisdiction.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Court Minute Book, supra note 60.
Id.
Id.
HENRY T. MALONE, CHEROKEES OF

THE OLD SOUTH 212-213 (1956); JOHN L. DICKSON, THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION FROM 1721 TO 1835 at 316, n.4 (1964).

71. Interview with Tennessee State Archive Staff (Dec. 29, 2003). See also HENRY T. MA212-213 (1956).
72. See Alice T. Colbert, Cherokee Adaptation to the Ideals of the American Republic 1791-

LONE, CHEROKEES OF THE OLD SOUTH

1838: Success or Failure?,12 PROC. AND PAPERS OF THE GA. ASS'N OF HISTORIANS 41-56 (1992);

Michelle Daniel, From Blood Feud to Jury System: The Metamorphosis of Cherokee Law from
1750 to 1840,11 AMERICAN INDIAN QUARTERLY, 97-125 (1987); DICKSON, supra note 70; CHARLOTTE H. PELTIER, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE EASTERN CHEROKEES 1580-1838 (1982); REID, supra note 52; MALONE, supra note 70; STRICKLAND, supra note
19; PERDUE, supra note 62, at 145, 150, 153, 175.
73. See STRICKLAND, supra note 19, at 73-102; MALONE, supra note 70, at 82-90; PELTIER,
supra note 72 at 156-175.
74. STRICKLAND, supra note 19; MALONE, supra note 70.
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From 1823 to 1835, the Cherokee Supreme Court addressed a grand
total of 252 matters. 75 To reach 252 matters, I have counted all matters that came before the Court, even when they did not require Court
action, such as the filing of a will or a bill of sale for slaves or an
emancipation of a slave. I found a total of 15 such matters. Excluding
these, the Court considered a total of 237 cases: 24 criminal and 213
civil. 76 The criminal cases account for 9.5% of the total number of
matters and 11.2% of the actual cases and controversies.7 7 Ifa case
was set over until another term of Court, I counted it again in the
subsequent year. During the operation of the Court, no criminal cases
were heard in 1823, 1830, 1831,78 1832 and 1833. 79
It should be noted that my tally differs from tallies reported by
other researchers. Malone writes "246 cases came up for settlement."8 0 He has almost certainly miscounted. For example, it is very
likely that, in the year 1823, Malone has counted one case twiceJohn Walker v. Joseph Rogers, which was heard on Monday, October
13, 1823 and reopened on Saturday, October 18, 1823, when it was
captioned Joseph Rogers v. John Walker and continued to 1824.81 This
was in the nature of a petition for a re-hearing of the same case 82 and
should only be counted once. Strickland and Dickson followed Malone's tabulations.8 3 The hand written tabulations have been open to
some 84
interpretation over the years. For example, Perdue counts 270
cases.

One reason for the discrepancies is that the cases are difficult to
decipher. Unlike their State Court brethren, Cherokee Supreme
Court Judges did not author written opinions.85 Instead, the Court
operated to afford both review of lower Court proceedings and trial
de novo before a jury; dispositions were noted by the Clerk rather
than by the Court itself.8 6 To determine the nature of the case in
question, the researcher must analyze a notation form rather than a
formal order of the Court. A typical Court Minute Book entry in a
criminal case is represented as follows:
75. See Court Minute Book, supra note 60.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. There were no entries all for the year 1831. It is very possible that cases that year were
recorded in another fashion and have been lost. See generally id.
79. See generally id.
80. MALONE, supra note 70, at 83.
81. Court Minute Book, supra note 60.
82. See id.
83. STRICKLAND, supra note 19, at 74; DICKSON, supra note 70, at 318.

84. PERDUE, supra note 62, at 231, n. 87.
85. See Court Minute Book, supra note 60.
86. Id.
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Cherokee Nation
vs.

)
)
)

)

37

Purchasing spiritous liquor from
a Citizen of the U. States

Elijah Hicks
)
The Court decide that the defendant is guilty of the breach of Cherokee LawAlthough this style of Court minute entry does not match the style
of written opinions by the State Supreme Courts of the time, it clearly
resembles the notations in 18th Century records of colonial North
Carolina's Salisbury District Superior Court, e.g.:
"No. 105
HUGH MONTGOMERY VS. DANIEL BOONE

Debt.
Judgment Con_
by Avery for sum of 61.13.2 proc.
Money & interest from the
th March
87 2 0
1770 till paid 7 Costs-"
Thus the records in the Court Minute Book look more like trial Court
notations from the late 18th Century rather than State Supreme Court
opinions from the early 19th Century.
After July of 1827, crimes alleged to have been committed within
the Cherokee Nation were defined constitutionally and can be recognized by their own lawful definitions.8 8 They are clearly labeled with
the Cherokee Nation as the plaintiff.89 However, between 1823 and
1827, identification is slightly more problematic because the Court
Minute Book is a little oblique in certain cases as to whether the case
is a crime or a tort. 90
For example, it might be tempting to label James Foster v. Jesse
Vann, by his administrator, as the first criminal case to come before
the Cherokee Supreme Court on October 16, 1823, "for a crime of
grand larceny."9 1 But such a conclusion would lead to a quirk: a criminal action apparently not abating with the death of the offender and
thus being prosecuted against his estate in the manner of a bill of attainder. 92 However, this case resulted in an action that has to charm
the modern practitioner-it was continued.93
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

(2007) (citing the North Carolina State Archives).
See, e.g., LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATIION, supra note 50, at 104.
See Court Minute Book, supra note 60.
Id.
Id. at October 16, 1823.
Id.
Id.
ROBERT MORGAN, BOONE 91
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The case returned to the docket four years later, on Monday, October 29, 1827, with a slightly different caption: James Foster v. The Peacock, Exec. of Jesse Vann, Decd.9 4 Here we learn that the case was

actually for "[r]ecovery of stolen cattle".95 Since by this time criminal
cases were clearly running in the name of the Nation, this case is actually a civil claim upon a decedent's estate.96
To ensure that only criminal cases from the Court Minute Book
were analyzed, it might have been tempting to compare the Cherokee
Supreme Court cases with cases from the neighboring state Supreme
Courts. But those Courts' criminal cases will appear more familiar to
the modern reader simply because the protection of the grand jury
was hardwired into the state constitutions from the outset. 97 Furthermore, as today, many crimes against the state may also suffice to be
torts, by which private individuals may bring civil actions. Thus, in
this analysis each entry regarding a matter before the Cherokee Supreme Court, particularly those prior to the enactment of the Constitution of 1827, was examined to determine whether the facts disclose
the elements of a crime or the punishment of one, even if the subject
matter of the case appears to be a private wrong, such as "pleas of
defraud" or hog stealing.
A printing press was established at the Cherokee Nation's capitol of
New Echota in what is now North Georgia. 98 Following the inception
of the syllabary by Sequoyah, enormous strides in literacy were
achieved in the Cherokee Nation by the close of the 1820's. 99 The
Cherokee Phoenix,later the Cherokee Phoenix and Indians'Advocate,

the national newspaper for the Cherokee Nation, was ingeniously
printed in multi-column format, often with one column in English, another in Cherokee, albeit mostly in English."°
The Cherokee Phoenix was internationally read and became a major organ for the Cherokee Nation's public relations effort with regard
to the clamor for removal.1"1 The Cherokee Phoenix covered legal
matters, including crimes occurring in the Nation. 2 Although the
Cherokee Phoenix did not comment directly on the work of the Court,
94.
95.
96.
97.
CONST.

Id. at October 29, 1827.
Id.
Id.
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 22; GA.
art. I, § 14.

CONST.

art. I, § 11(c); S.C.

CONST.

art. I, § 11; TENN.

98. GRANT FOREMAN, SEQUOYAH 14 (1938).
99. See DOUGLAS L. RiGHTs, THE A-,ERICAN INDIAN IN NORTH CAROLINA 208 (2d ed.
1957). ("Within a few months [of the introduction of the syllabary] thousands of illiterate Cherokees were able to read and write their own language, teaching each other in cabins and along
the roadside."); FOREMAN, supra note 98, at 23-39.
100. MALONE, supra note 70, at 158-59; FOREMAN, supra note 98, at 15.
101. MALONE, supra note 70, at 157-58, 167.
102. MALONE, supra note 70, at 137-165.
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reference to the newspaper brings a rich tableaux providing context to
the Cherokee Supreme Court's decisions. °3 Additionally, other historical records, including the records of the Indian Agents of the
United States Secretary of War, offer insights into the activities of the
Tribal Judges of the period.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF THE CHEROKEE SUPREME COURT
AND TRIBAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ON THE

FRONTIER,

1823-1835.

The Cherokee Nation had its own lawmakers, laws, a tripartite system of government, and beginning in the 1820's, Western style
Courts."° Naturally, the existence of the Cherokee Supreme Court
has been seen by historians as a manifestation of the desire to resist
further encroachment by the citizens of the United States on the territory of the Cherokee Nation:
The Cherokees had long realized the relationship between their laws
and the central issue of tribal politics, the retention of national land
and tribal status. The legal system had been used as an instrument in
preservation of tribal lands almost as long as the pressures from white
men had forced the Cherokees to guard their shrinking domain. 0 5
Creation of the Cherokee judicial system began with Judges who
presided over "councils to administer justice in all causes and complaints that may be brought forward for trial.. ."'I The original trial
Court sessions began on November 2, 1820.107 By law, the Nation was
divided into eight Districts for the administration of justice:
1st District- Chickamaugee;
2nd District-Challoogee;
3rd District- Coosewatee;
4th District- Amoah;
5th District- Hickory Log;
6th District- Etowah;
7th District- Tahquohee; and
8th District- Aquohee. 0 8
Under the 1820 law, four Circuit Judges were statutorily created to
preside over Circuits made up of clusters of two Districts and to consult with the District Judges. 0 9 The Circuit Judges were assigned
more expensive and complicated cases, including murder, leading one
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See Generally id.
See LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 15-18.
STRICKLAND, supra note 19, at 76.
LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 11.
DICKSON, supra note 70, at 303 n.51 (citing MALONE, supra note 70, at 198 n.13).
LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 15-18.
Id. at 11-12.
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commentator to analogize the District Judges to Justices of the Peace
and the Circuit Judges to general jurisdiction Judges. 110
The Supreme Court was created on November 12, 1822 by statute.' It was originally denominated as "a superior court, to be held
at New Town, during the session of each National Council, to be composed of the several Circuit Judges, to determine all causes which may
be appealed from the District Courts-. .. 112 Although the National

Council and Committee continued to refer to the high Court as the
Superior Court as late as 1824, from the time it began the Court referred to itself as the Supreme Court of the Cherokee Nation.1 13 The
Supreme Court of the Cherokee Nation commenced the disposition of
business on October 9, 1823.114

The first Judges were John Martin, James Daniel, Richard Walker
and James Brown. 1 5 "None of these early lawyers had Office or Inns
of Court education."' 1 6 Lionized over eighty years later as the history
making "noble knights of the Bar of the East Side," they and their
successors on the Cherokee Supreme Court
comprised the vanguard
l 7
of a Native bar that continues to this day. "
These legal minds and others drafted a Constitution in a continuing
effort to establish a sovereignty recognizable to the Americans." 8
The concept of the state as sovereign was alien to the Cherokees, but
with the dawn of the 19th Century "the Cherokees would take the
next tentative step and begin to recognize the binding force of the
sovereign's will. It would not be a sudden leap forward but one pursued cautiously by a people who realized that times had changed, and
that necessity demanded new ways and new laws.""'

9

"The adoption

of a constitution in 1827 was the climax in the establishment of a republic.' 2 ° As part of this effort, in 1827 the Court changed from
a
21
statutorily created body to a constitutionally authorized Court.1
Article V of the Cherokee Constitution vested the judicial powers
in a new Supreme Court and "such Circuit and Inferior Courts as the
'122
General Council may, from time to time ordain and establish.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
(1924).
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

DICKSON, supra note 70, at 303-05.
LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION,

supra note 50, at 28.
Id.
Id. at 32; Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 9, 1823.
Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 9, 1823.
STRICKLAND, supra note 19, at 121.
Id.
William P. Thompson, Courts of the Cherokee Nation, 2 CHRONICLES

OF OKLAHOMA

64

supra note 19, at 121.
REID, supra note 52, at 274-75.
MALONE, supra note 70, at 84.
Id. at 83-86.
STRICKLAND,

LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 126.
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Section 8 of the Article provided that "[t]he Judges of the Supreme
Court and Circuit Courts shall have comple[te] criminal Jurisdiction in
such cases and in such manner as may be pointed out by law."' 2 3
The nature of criminal prosecution in the Tribal Courts was different in some ways from that with which we are familiar in the modern
context. For one thing, "[g]rand juries and tribal prosecution by an
official solicitor were not introduced into the Cherokee legal system
until after the Civil War. Until that time criminal indictment was essentially a private procedure instituted by a wronged individual .. 124 Prosecutors do appear in the record, however, as appointed
counsel, and were required to post a bond for their services. 2 5 Punishments included "confiscation, fines," and "corporeal punishment,"
including flogging, "ear cropping and death," typically by hanging.126
In these new laws, however, there were many rights and protections
instantly familiar to modern Americans: a due process right, a right to
a remedy at law, a right of confrontation, a right to speedy and public
trial, a right to trial by jury, a right to bail, a right to have compulsory
process, a prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination, a prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures, a prohibition
of general war127
rants, and a prohibition of double jeopardy.
An additional protection for the accused included trial by indictment.'2 8 Under Article V, Section 11 of the Cherokee Constitution of
1827, indictments were to "run in the name of the Cherokee Nation."1'29 Indictments were to include allegations of the date, defendant and crime.130 Additionally, indictments included constitutionally
compulsory, conclusory language that the alleged crime was "against
the peace and dignity" of the Nation. 3 '
III.

CASE ANALYSES:

THE EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

IN THE CHEROKEE NATION,

1823-1835.

In eleven of the twenty four criminal appeals heard by the Cherokee Supreme Court, no charge is specified other than a usual, but not
completely consistent, notation: "breaking" or "violating the Chero123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 127.
supra note 19, at 83, 146.
supra note 50, at 99.
DICKSON, supra note 70, at 309.
PELTIER, supra note 72, at 158-159; DICKSON, supra note 70, at 317-318.
DICKSON, supra note 70, at 333.
Id.
Id.
Id.
STRICKLAND,

LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION,
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kee Law. 1 3 2 These otherwise undistinguished cases nevertheless offer glimpses into the processes of the Cherokee Supreme Court.
The first criminal appeal taken up by the Cherokee Supreme Court
was Cherokee Nation vs. Elisha Dyer, heard on November 1, 1824.133
In this case, the Supreme Court found "no bill" and apparently dismissed the case. 1 34 The Court clearly determined that it had the authority to look into the sufficiency of the charges and to adjudicate
accordingly.' 3 5 Similarly, on October 26, 1825, in Thomas Fields v.
Cyrus Blanks, on a charge of "violation of the Cherokee Law," the
Court found "no bill.",136 Finally, in the first murder case the Court
adjudicated, Cherokee Nation v. Gah Co We, an "indictment for murder of Ezthral Wright, Kingstick's brother, we the judges of the supreme court find no bill against the dft Gah Co We.' 37 Thus the
Court did not hesitate to dismiss a case, even one as serious as murder, if it concluded that the foundational charging document was
insufficient. 3 8
The Cherokee Supreme Court did not hesitate to dismiss other
criminal cases as well, displaying somewhat of a reluctance to show
any favoritism for the new republic. 39 For example, despite the
hazards of frontier travel, and the indisputable fact that the Court itself had been continued on more than one occasion when judges were
missing, the Court was swift to dismiss the case of Cherokee Nation v.
Edward Crittinton Taluskee, on October 28, 1826, when "no prosecutor" was present.' 40 No Judge rose to intercede on behalf of the Nation.1 41 Modern practitioners of criminal defense might find such
judicial restraint refreshing. Incidents like this may have led to the
November 8, 1828 passage of a law requiring prosecutors to post a
bond:
Whereas, much inconcenience (sic) is experienced by the courts in this
Nation, in the trial of criminal cases, in consequences of prosecutors
not being bound for the prosecution of such criminal cases, therefore,
Resolved by the Committee and Council, in General Council convened, That after the passage of this act, any person or persons, not a
public officer, who shall undertake to prosecute any criminal or
criminals shall be, and he, she, or they are hereby required to give
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See Court Minute Book, supra note 60.
Court Minute Book, supra note 60, November 1, 1824.
Id.
Id.
Court Minute Book, supra note 60, October 26, 1825.
Court Minute Book, supra note 60, October 21, 1825.
See id.
Court Minute Book, supra note 60, October 28, 1826.
Id.
Id.
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bond and security, in a sum double the amount of such prosecution,
for the faithful performance of prosecuting the criminals, who may be
arrested and brought to trial.
Be it further resolved by the authorities aforesaid, That it shall be the
duty of such prosecutors to give bond and security previous to their
receiving warrants for the arresting of such criminals.1 42
Other undocumented alleged crimes illustrate the fact that the
Court served as a de novo tribunal, not merely as a court of appeals
and errors.14 3 On October 24, 1825, John Miller was acquitted by the
Court of "violating the Cherokee Law."' 4 4 The next day, the case of
Archy Foreman v. William Blyth came on for trial before a jury.
The case spilled over into the following day at which time "the jury
found that he did not violate the Cherokee Law." 14' 6 This power to try
cases de novo was recognized in law on October 18, 1828, when the
National Council enacted a statute providing, among other things,
that:
the Supreme Judges elected agreeably to the Constitution, shall compose the Supreme Court, and shall have full power to try, and decide
all cases upon the Supreme Court docket, that remain untried, which
may come under the jurisdiction of the laws of the Nation, and shall
have complete cognizance of all cases appealed from the several circuit Courts, as may be pointed out by law. The Supreme Court shall
also have power to act and decide upon criminal cases without reference to appeals from the Circuit Courts.' 4 7
An appeal to the Supreme Court thus offered litigants not only a second bite at the apple, but also the possibility of a completely different
jury pool; these appellate cases, heard in New Town in what is now
north Georgia, were often far removed from their original venues. 48
We do not know and cannot tell from the Court Minute Book what
processes triggered the opportunity for a jury trial de novo. 4 In 1825
in Thomas Fields v. John Miller, the Court decided the case without
input from the jury, holding: "[i]t is the opinion of the Court that the
142. CHEROKEE PHOENIX (New Echota), January 14, 1829.
143. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 886 (2009).
144. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 24, 1825.
145. Id. at October 25, 1825.
146. Id. at October 26, 1825.
147. Cherokee Phoenix and Indians' Advocate (New Echota), Jan. 7, 1829.
148. New Echota Historic Site: About North Georgia (October 22, 2009), http://ngeorgia.
com/ang/NewEchotaHistoricSite.
149. Malone and Dickson assert that "a jury was required to bring in the court's verdict."
MALONE, supra note 70, at 83; DICKSON, supra note 70, at 315 (citing CHEROKEE PHOENIX, April
10, 1828). However, I can find no support for this proposition. And, in any event, review of the
Court Minute Book discloses that jury trials were not afforded in every case before the Supreme
Court.
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150
defendant be fined $5.00" for this violation of the Cherokee Law.
Similarly, in Cherokee Nation v. Brice Martin the "Court found for
defendant" without referring the matter to the jury. 51 Likewise, the
Court found the prisoner guilty in the case of Cherokee Nation vs.
Jesse Ratley. 152 The Court minute indicates that Ratley was a prisoner
who was incarcerated.153 There was no national prison; instead, defendants were kept under guard. 5 4 Upon finding himself under guard
at the time he came before the Court, Ratley perhaps sought an expeditious disposition in a bench trial rather than awaiting the arrival of
the jurors.
In Archey Foremanfor Cherokee Nation vs. William M.J. Evnkize, a
finding for the defense left no culpable party to pay the $9.75 witness
1 55
fee for twelve days of inconvenience on the part of Major Martin.
It is unknown whether the exonerated defendant was required to pay
the witness fee nonetheless.
A finding of guilt was not specifically rendered for a particular "fellony" in Cherokee Nation vs. John Fields, where the Clerk noted that
"[t]he Court decide that the defendant pay to the Nation three dollars,
considered to be the per Cent due, & two dollars to the plaintiff for
damages.' 56 Likewise, in another case "for breaking the Cherokee
Law", Archie Foreman vs. Richard Huffacre, the Clerk noted that the
defendant confessed judgment in the sum of ten dollars and that the
Court awarded the costs of the lawsuit in the amount of $4.50.157
These two cases show that the Court dipped into its reservoir of equitable powers in assessing restitution and approving the defendant's
admitted amount of damages. 5 8
"Horse theft thus appears to have been the most common crime in
the first quarter of the 19th Century and the most difficult to restrain
among the Cherokees and whites.' ' 159 "More enforcement machinery
[was] directed [towards it] than any other one crime. '' a6 The crime

150. Court Minute Book, supra note 60.
151. Id. at October 16, 1827.
152. Id. at October 20, 1827.
153. Id.
154. LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 111.
155. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at November 13, 1828.
156. Id. at Oct. 23, 1827
157. See id. at October 21, 1825.
158. Id.; See Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 23, 1827.
159. PELTIER, supra note 72, at 137.
160. Thomas Lee Ballenger, The Development of Law and Legal Institutions Among the
Cherokees 44 (1938) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation., University of Oklahoma)
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grew to include more than the theft of horses:16 1enterprising criminals
began a brisk business in selling stolen stock.
The Cherokee Phoenix reprinted an article from the Southern Advocate which described how horse theft had morphed into organized
crime:
Pony Club in Carroll County, Georgia. We are informed by a gentleman who has recently passed through that place, of indubitable
credibility, that there is a CLUB, who make a profession of stealing
horses as well from their own citizens as from strangers. Their plans,
from their contiguity and intercourse with the Cherokees, have been
so judiciously executed as to elude detection. They do not we understand, profess to take the life of a traveller, but only his horse, in order, it may be presumed, that in cases of conviction, their punctilious
clemency may establish a contested principle in penal law, that there is
a distinct and tangible difference in value between property and life.
This policy reminds us of the reply of Judge Burnet, to the horsestealer, who upon being asked what he had to say, why judgment of
death should not be passed upon him, and answering, "that it was hard
to hang a man for only stealing a horse," was told by the Judge, 'Man,
thou art not only to be hanged for stealing a horse, but that horses
may not be stolen.' That punishments should be proportioned to offences (sic) is just and politic we admit, but that there is a lamentable
deficiency in the justice and morality of this new country overlooking
the alieni appetens which is so manifestly a nuisance to their neighbors
and strangers, is equally notorious.
We have frequently heard of this pony club.- It is said by a Traveller
who passed this place some time since directly from Carroll, that this
stealing association has become so dexterious (sic) in its profession,
that if the d 1 had been in the shape of a pony, he would ere this
have fallen a prey to its agility. "Pony club" is but a limited name and
will by no means give a correct idea of this neighboring
combination"cow club," "hog club," &c. may properly be added. 16
The "Pony Club" continued to plague the Cherokee Nation throughout the late 1820's:
Another racer gone to the Poney (sic) Club Carroll County, Georgia,
or to some other place of similar distinction. On Tuesday or Wednesday last was taken without my leave, a small dark chesnut (sic) sorrel
Mare, blazed face, all feet white, her fore legs white nearly to the
knees, bare-footed all round, and rather wild when handled by a stranger particularly and mane very short, owing to her having the
Lampers.
161. William Lesley, Ten DollarsReward, CHEROKEE PHOENIX (New Echota) Oct. 29, 1828
(explaining that William Lesley offered a $10.00 reward for the residence of one William Stone,
who sold Lesley a mount which later proved to be stolen).
162.

SOUTHERN ADVOCATE, CHEROKEE PHOENIX

(New Echota), Sept. 24, 1828, (citing from

Southern Advocate).
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There is some reason to suspect a lurking kind of white man, who left
this place about that time on his way to Marion Co. Ten. or Jackson
Co. Alabama. Friends to the suppression of such villainy, are earnestly requested in all the adjacent states, to keep a sharp look out. I
will give ten dollars for the delivery of the thief & mare to me at this
place, or five for the mare alone if caught in the Nation.
ISAAC H. HARRIS.
Nov. 5th, 1828163
The existence of organized crime made it a relatively simple matter
to use the criminal racket for political purposes as well. 1 64 The "Pony
Club" was suggested to be at the forefront of a wave of intruders into
the Nation who, "[i]nstead of stealing," began to shoot the horses and
cattle of the Cherokees. 165 Theft or destruction of horses, the main
method of transport across the vast distances of the Cherokee Nation,
affected commerce, communication and
travel. 16 6 Also, the destruc167
tion of cattle eliminated food stores.
When the United States government proved unable to protect the
boundaries of the Indian Nation, the National Council was forced to
take action, even though the Cherokees had not expelled intruders
before:
[o]ne group of about twenty families, members of a gang of horse
thieves called the Pony Club, had squatted along the main road to
Alabama, and the Council was afraid that the Cherokees would be
blamed for their crimes. The Council appointed Major Ridge, a prominent figure with a distinguished record as war leader and public servant, to lead a troop of Light Horse, the national police force, to evict
the intruders. They did so, burning out the families, who later testified
that they were terrified by Ridge, who wore a buffalo skull headdress
complete with horns, and his men, painted for war. A posse from Carroll County tracked the Cherokee Light Horse and captured four, one
of whom they beat to death. The others they carried off to jail. On the
way, two escaped, but the third, Rattling Gourd, they held. Hugh
Montgomery, the federal agent assigned to the Cherokee Nation, got
him released with the argument that he was not an officer in the Light
Horse, made no decisions, and was simply following orders. The central question, the right of the sheriff of Carroll County, Georgia, to
enter the Cherokee Nation and arrest four Cherokees (not to mention
163.

Isaac H. Harris, A Little Too Friendly, CHEROKEE PHOENIX (New Echota), Nov. 5,

1828.
164. CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE (New Echota), Feb. 11, 1829.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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killing one of them) for168acting in accordance with a treaty provision,
remained unanswered.

With no answer to the central question of the competing attempts
by Georgia to exercise criminal jurisdiction within the Cherokee Nation, the issues were destined to repeat themselves.16 9 The varieties
were almost without limit. 170 In 1827, a Cherokee citizen named Old
Man was charged in Carroll County, Georgia with the murder of a
citizen of Georgia, one Dennis May.' 7 1 Old Man had been arrested by
Georgia authorities, but while crossing the Chatahoochee River, he
dove in the water and escaped in the darkness. 72 Believing the fugitive to have fled to the Cherokee Nation, the Governor of Georgia
demanded that Indian Agent Hugh Montgomery assist in the extradition. 1 73 The Cherokees responded to Montgomery that they would
assist in locating and apprehending Old Man, but insisted that he be
tried in the United States District Court as provided, for example, by
Article VI of the Treaty of Hopewell, November 28, 1785.174 Fulminating, the Governor of Georgia dashed off a curt reply to Montgomery on December 12, 1827:
The place where, and the court, by whom he will be tried are matters
to be settled, here, in settling these questions we shall not consult Mr.
Hicks or pay any respect either to his wishes or opinions. You will no
doubt conceive it to be your duty, however, to instruct the Cherokees
the State[']s
that Justice will be done and a fair trial had, whether
17 5
Judges or the United States Judges preside at it.
Several times Georgia and Tennessee exercised criminal jurisdiction
over Cherokee Indians for crimes allegedly occurring within the Cherokee Nation. 176 Indeed, this was the basis for Georgia's notorious
168.

THEDA PERDUE & MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE CHEROKEE NATION AND THE TRAIL OF

TEARS 73-74 (2007).
169. Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs 1824-1881 Cherokee Agency, East,
microformed on M-234, reel 72, at 642-55.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 643-44.
172. Id. at 645.
173. Id. at 649.
174. Id. at 652.
175. Records of the Cherokee Indian Agency in Tennessee, 1801-1835, microformed on M208, reel 10.
176. "Under the new state laws, Cherokees were frequently arrested and detained in the
Hall County Jail." TIM A. GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL 111 (2002); see also
State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256 (1835) (holding that the murder of a native Cherokee by a native
Cherokee on Cherokee land was subject to the jurisdiction of Tennessee courts); but see State v.
Ross, 15 Tenn. 74 (1834) (holding that Tennessee did not have the right to tax or regulate residents of the Cherokee Nation); Comet v. Winston's Lessee, 10 Tenn. 143, 146 (1826) (holding
that Cherokees "are in truth a nation of people under the tutelage of the Government of the
United States"); Blair v. Pathkiller's Lessee, 10 Tenn. 407 (1830) (holding that a fee estate taken
by Tennessee from the United States remained subject to the rights of an individual Cherokee
and was thus encumbered).
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challenge to the supremacy of the United States Constitution through
the State's infamous lynching of George Tassell, hung by the State
1 77
before the Supreme Court of the United States could hear his plea.
Georgia did not limit itself to asserting jurisdiction over the Cherokees-it attempted to assert criminal jurisdiction over United States
soldiers operating in the Cherokee Nation under orders of the Federal
government. 178 On October 14, 1824, James Williams wrote the Secretary of War to report on his actions, along with Col. Archibald
Turk's company, in removing intruders from Cherokee lands.1 79 In
particular, he enclosed a Bill of Indictment from Hall County, Georgia in which he, Col. Turk and others were indicted on August 11, 1824
for the murder of James Dickson, an illegal white settler in Cherokee
Nation lands "not having the fear of God before their eyes, but being
moved and instigated by the devil. .. "180 On January 6, 1825, Col.

Turk wrote the Secretary, requesting his assistance for the upcoming
trial.' 81
While Georgia sought to exercise jurisdiction over Cherokees, one
case documents the Cherokee Nation's judicial branch of government
exercising criminal jurisdiction over a white citizen of Georgia.' 82 On
September 19, 1829, Jesse Stancell, a "white man," was arrested within83
the Cherokee Nation at Elejay and charged with horse stealing.
Stancell was detained "in close custody for the space of thirty hours"
during which time he was tried by a jury. 84 George Saunders, who
the Court Minute Book reveals had previously served as Foreman of
Cherokee Supreme Court juries, served in the same capacity on
Stancell's jury. 85 Stancell was sentenced "to receive fifty stripes on
the bare back, which was fifty less than what [was] common ...

for

such offence.' 1 86 His captors "stripped [him], tied [him] up to a tree"
and executed the sentence upon him. 1 87 Saunders averred that "[w]e
acted agreeably to the laws of our country in punishing the man."'188
177. GARRISON, supra note 176, at 111-124.
178. Id.
179. Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs 1824-1881 Cherokee Agency, East,
microformed on M-234, reel 71, at 452-60, 457 (identifying letter of James Williams to the Secretary of War John Calhoun, October 14, 1824).
180. Id.
181. Id.; Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs 1824-1881 Cherokee Agency, East,
microformed on M-234, reel 71, at 683-86 (identifying letter of Col. Archibald Turk to the Secretary of War John Calhoun, January 6, 1825).
182. George Saunders, Letter to the Editor, CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE,

Dec. 10, 1829, at 2.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol32/iss1/3

22

Martin: The Nature and Extent of the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction by

2009]

CHEROKEE S.CT. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

49

Crossing back into Georgia following this indignity, Stancell immediately made his way to the chambers of the Honorable Augustin S.
Clayton, "Judge of the Supreme Courts of the western Circuit of" the
State of Georgia and judicial nemesis of the Cherokees.189 Stancell's
affidavit before Judge Clayton omitted the stolen horse and his jury
trial. 9 ° The affidavit characterized him not as a thief, but as a victim
"to the great effusion of his blood, the laceration of his back and sides,
leaving deep wounds, gashes and bruises on the same. .. "191
Judge Clayton issued criminal process for the arrest of Saunders,
who reported to the Phoenix as follows:
the officers of that state sent armed men to take all the Indians that
were concerned in whipping him. I understood that they were on their
way, and went to the Long Swamp to meet them. They met me there.
I there gave them my bond1 92and security for my appearance at court at
Gainsville in Hall County.
The case continued to simmer for the next year. In his Annual Message to the people on October 16, 1830, Principal Chief John Ross
commented on "the case of Judge Sanders for punishing a whiteman
under the laws of the nation, for the crime of horse stealing;" as part
of a litany of complaints against the Georgia Judiciary in general and
Judge Clayton in particular.1 93 Georgia responded in part by passing
a statute in 1830 which provided in part:
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid. That
after the time aforesaid, it shall not be lawful for any person or persons, under colour, or by authority, of the Cherokee tribe, or any of its
laws or regulations, to hold any court or tribunal whatever, for the
purpose of hearing and determining causes, civil or criminal; or to give
any judgment in such causes, or to issue, or cause to issue any process
against the person or property of any of said tribe. And all persons
offending against the provisions of this section, shall be guilty of a high
misdemeanor, and subject to indictment, and on conviction thereof
shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary at hard labour for the space of
four years . ..194
189. Id.; see also GARRISON, supra note 176, at 111-112 (explaining Judge Clayton's adversarial relationship with the Cherokees).
190. Saunders, supra note 182.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. John Ross, "Annual Message," CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE, October 16, 1830; see also GARRISON, supra note 176, at 266-267 (discussing John Sanders). Garrison
lists Saunders as "John Sanders", perhaps getting the misspelling from Ross's Annual Message
or confusing George Saunders for Judge John Sanders, the elected District Judge of the
Coosewaytee District in 1828. It must be the same person, unless the scenario repeated itself.
Further, Garrison indicates that Sanders/Saunders was jailed by Judge Clayton, however, Saunders' own account to the Phoenix notes that he posted bond at the side of the road.
194. MONROE E. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 39 (1973).
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This example exposes the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a
citizen of the United States by the Tribal Court. Such action is seen to
be in the continuum of push and pull on the frontier between the
States and the Cherokee Nation, with the Nation seeking a successful
mechanism of enforcement of law in order to maintain stability.' 95 In
this context, the Nation's exercise of enforcement machinery is both
understandable and legitimate; it also reflected the actual state of
affairs.
Despite the ravings of Georgians, the Cherokee Nation prosecuted
Cherokee Indians for horse theft in the Tribal Courts.1 9 6 In the first
Cherokee Supreme Court case specifically denominated as horse
theft, David Quinton, Sr. was acquitted on Saturday, October 21,
1826.197 On Wednesday, May 21, 1828, the Phoenix reported on a trial
of Cherokees who were convicted of stealing horses from whites in
neighboring Carroll County, Georgia:
At the last Circuit Court held in Hightower, three persons were convicted for stealing horses out of Carrol [sic] Co. & were sentenced to
receive fifty lashes each. These persons, we are told, stole upon the
principle of rendering evil for evil. How backward some of our neighboring whites may be to do justice to the Indians, we confess we feel a
195. The protection of the Courts and the struggle for jurisdiction was not limited to the
Cherokee Nation and the neighboring States. Before asserting criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians, the Cherokees "pressed very hard to institute a suit in the Federal Court against a white
man charged with having robbed, or stolen two slaves from a native." Records of the Cherokee
Indian Agency in Tennessee, 1801-1835, microformed on M-208, reel 9 (Letter from Indian
Agent McMinn to the Secretary of War, June 24, 1823). Agent McMinn refused this request and
instructed the Cherokees to gather their evidence whilst he awaited instructions from the Secretary. Id. When the Indians protested that the previous Agent, Col. Return J. Meigs, would
never have waited for instructions in such circumstances, McMinn reminded the Cherokees that
"they were in quite solvent circumstances, and able to support the suit, which they admitted ....
" Id. The Cherokees continued that if the Government was willing to pay the expenses of suit,
why should their Agent oppose the request? Id. Agent McMinn advised them that the "Government had determined to curtail its expenses, that it became my duty to aid in lessening expenses .... . Id. In particular, McMinn stated:
That during their minority, they had a just claim upon the resources of the Govt of the
U.States, but that this claim would diminish in the precise ratio, that their Nation, would
approximate toward a State of Civilized life, and as a proof, that they were advancing with
great rapidity, I referred them to the organization of their nation by which they created
laws, and held Courts, and appointed civil officers to carry those laws into execution.
Id. McMinn had already investigated one State Court trial involving the murder of a Native that
year and delegated a subordinate to sit through another. Records of the Cherokee Indian
Agency in Tennessee, 1801-1835, microformed on M-208, reel 9 (Letter from Indian Agent McMinn to the Secretary of War, March 6, 1823); Records of the Cherokee Indian Agency in Tennessee, 1801-1835, microformed on M-208, reel 9 (Letter from Indian Agent McMinn to Joseph
Rogers, May 4, 1823). Thus, in order to avoid the floodgates of litigation and, typically, to save
money, the United States, through its own Agent, told the Cherokees to use their own Courts.
Records of the Cherokee Indian Agency in Tennessee, 1801-1835, microformed on M-208, reel 9
(Letter from Indian Agent McMinn to the Secretary of War, June 24, 1823). No surprise, then,
that they did.
196. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 21, 1826.
197. Id.
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pleasure in noticing this instance of the impartiality of our courts. It
would be well if the authorities of Carrol [sic] County (Gov. Forsythe's [sic] Ministers) will look about and punish their offending citizens. It would be a sweeping work if they98were to begin. So much
"for the success of the new Constitution."
It is possible that one of those three persons tried in Hightower, John
C. Bird, appealed to the Cherokee Supreme Court. On October 28,
1828, in The Nation vs. John C. Bird, the defendant entered a guilty
plea to horse stealing and was sentenced to receive 100 lashes, fifty
more 9than
the number imposed at the Circuit Court level earlier that
1 9
year.

Other theft crimes occupied significant portions of the Cherokee
Supreme Court's docket.2 °° Friday, October 24, 1828, saw two cases
of alleged stealing.20 1 In Cherokee Nation v. Robert Saunders &
Wayahuttah, the defendants were acquitted of stealing money, despite
the efforts of a prosecutor named Wolf.20 2 In the next case, Beaver
2 3
Carrier was convicted of theft and sentenced to receive 75 lashes. 1
2
°4
In 1827, Bledsoe Gore was acquitted of theft.
The final criminal
case heard by the Cherokee Supreme Court was a multi-defendant
jury trial for hog stealing.20 5 In a mixed verdict the six man jury found
Choo Noo Las Kee guilty and fined him $10.00, but acquitted Rain
Crow and Sleeping Rabbit.20 6
A delightful piece of ephemera is laid into the Court Minute
Book-the closing argument of an attorney in a hog stealing case. Although we do not know whether the document is connected to any of
the reported cases, it gives some insight into the court rhetoric of the
period:
May it please the Court
While Bonaparte is marching his army from Elba to Paris and from
Paris back to Elba inundating the whole country in blood I stand here
the humble advocate of this notorious hog thief. The goats may climb
to the summit of those mountains. The sheep may feed on the fields
198.

CHEROKEE PHOENIX

(New Echota), May 21, 1828.

199. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 28, 1828.
200. Thievery was also a focus of the Cherokee Phoenix. See generally, CHEROKEE PHOENIX
(New Echota), July 9, 1828 (noting the occurrences of breaking and entering, larceny and posses-

sion of a stolen horse); and George Harlin, Pocket Book Lost,

CHEROKEE

PHOENIX

(New

Echota), Aug. 13, 1828 (noting an occurrence of pickpocketing).
201. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 24, 1828..
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id., at October 23, 1827.
205. Id., at October 30, 1834.
206. Id.
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below and the cattle may graze the grass off the meadow but my client
are no more guilty of stealing that are hog than a toad got no tail.20 7
The dockets of the lower Courts also exhibit multiple cases of theft:
"We understand that two thieves were lately tried at Coosewaytee.
One was a very noted one, whose name we have the honor of publishing in our paper. Both were found guilty. The principal one2 °8received
one hundred lashes on the bare back, and the other fifty.
Murder was the most serious crime to come before the Cherokee
Supreme Court. Willful murder in the Cherokee Nation was punishable by death.20 9 Three documented murder cases came before the
Cherokee Supreme Court during its existence. 2 10 None of the three
cases resulted in a conviction before the Court. 211 As noted above, in
the first murder case, the Court found the indictment to be defective.212 In the third murder case, a twelve person jury found The
Broom not guilty on Wednesday, October 29, 1834.213
The second murder case reviewed by the Supreme Court, Cherokee
Nation v. Noo Cha Wee, is intriguing in that it anticipates the frantic
efforts of modern capital counsel to litigate on multiple fronts at the
last minute.21 4 It also demonstrates an assumption of criminal jurisdiction by the legislative and executive branches.2 15
The case was heard by the Court on October 19, 1829 and reported
on October 21, 1829.216 Noo Cha Wee, "a criminal, who had been
condemned to die on that day by the circuit court of Aquohee District
for the murder of Ahmahyouhah," requested that the sentence imposed be suspended. 217 After some deliberation, marked in the Court
Minute Book by the scratching out of initial rulings, the Court held:
"The sentence having been [im]posed in the Circuit Court, this Court
decide that they have no power of suspending the sentence of said
Circuit Court. ' '2 18 Here, therefore, we find an example of the Court
declining criminal jurisdiction, which might affect the sentence in a
207. See generally Court Minute Book, supra note 60.
208. CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE (New Echota), Mar. 18, 1829.
209. LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 104.

210. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 21, 1825; October 21, 1829; October 29,
1834.
211. Id.
212. Court Minute Book, supra note 61, at October, 21, 1825.
213. Id., at October 29, 1834; See generally LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50,
at 103 (stating that murder cases required twelve jurors).
214. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 21, 1829.
215. Id.; CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE (New Echota), Feb. 24, 1830 (stating that the National Council provided that "a respite of five days shall be allowed to the criminal after sentence of death shall be passed, before he shall be executed..
216. See Court Minute Book, supra note 60.
217. Id.; CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE (New Echota), Oct. 21, 1829.
218. CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE (New Echota), Oct. 21, 1829.
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homicide case.21 9 The decision is notable for its deference to the authority of the lower Court, recognizing the appellate court's proper
role reviewing errors or trying cases where it had original jurisdic20
tion.20
In this declination, the Court foreshadowed the trend of modern courts to avoid re-litigating homicide cases.22 1
Noo Cha Wee and his supporters were not quite finished, though.
Moving swiftly, at two o'clock that afternoon, the day of his scheduled
execution, Noo Cha Wee appeared before the Clerk of the National
Council with a petition containing "upwards of fifty signatures, praying" for a reprieve of his death sentence.2 22 The National Committee
immediately took the matter up and considered a special law, "discharge[ed] from the sentence of death that was pronounced against
him by the Circuit Judge, Daniel M'Coy...223
[a]fter short addresses, the question was put, shall the prisoner be reprieved of (sic) not?-yeas 31 Nays.3 A resolution for the reprieve of
the prisoner was then drawn and signed and sent to the principal Chief
for his approval. He being absent, the Assistant principal Chief put
to the instrument. The prisoner was then set at
his signature
22 4
liberty.

In this instance, the National Council stepped in where the Court
would not. 2 5 The Cherokee Phoenix explained the extenuating circumstances: "It appeared from the evidence by which he was convicted that the murder was not premeditated or willful. The criminal
did the fatal deed under mitigating circumstances. 2 26 The restraint of
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

223.
224.

LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 133.
CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE (New Echota), Oct. 21, 1829.

225. In another example of the Nation's exercise of criminal jurisdiction over citizens of the
United States, the Committee of the National Council completely pre-empted the Court system
in the case of James Pettit. Bigamy was illegal in the Nation, and it was specifically illegal for
white men to have more than one Cherokee wife. LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note

50, at 57. On Wednesday, October 28, 1829, on motion of James Martin, the Committee issued a
warrant directing the Marshal to arrest and bring James Pettit, a white man, before the body
where he was arraigned on charges of bigamy and mistreating his Cherokee wife, Elizabeth.
CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE (New Echota), Nov. 4, 1829. A trial before the

Legislative Council immediately ensued, whereupon "it was decided that Mrs. Pettit had a sufficient provocation to leave Mr. Pettit's house," Pettit was fined $500.00, and ordered removed
from his plantation in favor of Elizabeth. Id. Acting swiftly, the Marshal had Pettit's crops up
for sale to satisfy the fine, which was to enure to the benefit Mrs. Pettit. Id. On February 19,
1830, Principal Chief John Ross reported to Col. Montgomery, the Agent for the United States,
that Pettit had reconciled with his wife and was back on his former lands, making improvements.
Despite the reconciliation, the Principal Chief considered Pettit to be an intruder and requested
that he be dealt with accordingly. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee
Agency East, 1824-1881, microformed on M-234, reel 74, at 240-43 (identifying letter of John
Ross to Hugh Montgomery, February 19, 1830).
226. CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE (New Echota), Oct. 21, 1829.
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the Court, then, resulted in the National Council assuming jurisdiction
to consider evidence of the crime, which is a judicial function.22 7
The lack of murder convictions in the Supreme Court does not indicate that the crime was taken lightly, however. On May 28, 1828, the
Phoenix covered an execution:
Mr. Boudinott:- Perhaps the communication of Mr. Huss, (The Spirit,)
contained in your paper of May 14, including the last words of the
man who was executed for murder near Chickamauga Court House,
may not be uninteresting to your English readers. I have, (with assistance,) prepared a translation, which I offer for insertion.
W.
TRANSLATION.
I here transcribe the addresses of the man who was executed at Crawfish-town a few days since. The first address, which I give below, he
requested me to write for him, when he was about to be executed. In
the morning, while the sun was yet low, I penned it for him, on the
same day on which he was to be hung at noon, April 18, 1828.
These are his words: "This day I address you, my Uncles, that you
may abandon the practice of drunkenness. Forsake all evil, ye whom I
leave behind. I desire you to believe that the practice of drunkenness
which you follow is evil. Follow that which is good. Abandon drunkenness. If you believe, we shall meet again. I have relinquished my
sins to God, who only, I believe, is able to save me. Do ye also the
same. Truly drunkenness is exceedingly evil, for you see before you
the end of my life; my intemperance is the cause of it. Therefore it is
that I request you to forsake it. Do not fail to regard what I say, now
that I am delivering to you my last words; for this day I shall leave my
present life.
To you also, my brothers, I say, follow that which is good. Regard my
words. This also I say to you respecting our aged parents, still provide
for their support. Do not injure them, for I had promised to support
them, and this is my end; forsake them not, but support our parents as
long as they live.
Let this be all my address."
The following address also he made when he was just about to be
executed.
"I have thought I will speak this day-let them remember my last
words. My prayers only are present to my mind [literally cleave fast to
227. Intervention of the National Council on behalf of a criminal defendant was not unprecedented, despite a law enacted on October 17, 1823 which attempted to channel litigation into the
Courts and away from the Council and National Committee. LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION,
supra note 50, at 31-32. On October 27, 1825, the Committee agreed with the Council and
enacted a special law on behalf of Samuel Henry, remitting his Court imposed fine for introducing brandy into the Nation. Id. at 49.
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me,] I cannot put them away. I endeavor only after that which was
spoken to us yesterday.* There is nothing in my heart which does not
accord with that place of destination of which they speak. Should that
be my destination, we shall meet again, if you believe. Now we are
met for the last time. Truly the drunkenness which prevails is a great
evil. Forsake it. Follow that which is good. Keep in mind such things
as these.
I have also made a request to those who are left behind [my relatives]
to forsake the evil of drunkenness. I wish they may regard it. But here
is one standing by-he see us. This is all I can now say no more."
Friends, Brethren; Let us read and meditate upon the addresses delivered at Crawfishtown, which are here printed. In his first address,
made to his relations, his object evidently is to persuade them to forsake the evil of drunkenness and to regard the commands of our
maker. And again in his second address he exhorts us all to forsake
the evil of drunkenness. Thus it is that when God directs his mercy
towards any individual, he is then desirous of forsaking sin, and such is
the language which he uses. For it is manifest, that he must forsake sin
who would obtain the mercy of God; for God has said in his word. For
the language of the beloved Son of God is such as this; "Forsake your
sins, and I will give you eternal life and peace." But all the unbelieving our Maker will banish into hell. When we read, let us remember
what God has said, that if we believe it will be well with us.
This also let us remember, that in truth drunkenness is exceedingly
evil:- that which he [the criminal] especially exhorts us to forsake. For
it is manifest that the great prevalence of drunkenness amongst us is
the source of multiplied evils. For this man, who was executed, explicitly states that his intemperance was the cause. And it may easily be
perceived, that, as drunkenness increases in our country so the instances multiply in which men do injury to each other. This is our
greatest enemy. Manifold are the evils of which drunkenness is the
source. I also, therefore, entreat you to forsake this creator of
mischief.
JOHN HUSS.
May 3, 1828.
*Isuppose 22Mr,
8 Huss had made an address, after the trial on the preceding day
Huss later served as a Judge on the Cherokee Supreme Court, so his
comments may be seen as part of a broader concern on his part to
deter law breaking in general and the tragedy of alcohol abuse in
particular.
228. John Huss, Letter to the Editor, CHEROKEE PHOENIX (New Echota), May 28, 1828.
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Ardent spirits were also asserted as causation for "a murder ...
committed not far from Crutchfield's mill, by one O-lah [in Cherokee]
who in a fit of intoxication thrust a butcher knife into the temple of
another, Ah-ne-yvng-le, [in Cherokee]. '2 29 Another case provided "a
melancholy comment on the evils of intemperance and Sabbath
breaking. '23 ° George Chapman and Daniel Wright "(both excessively
intemperate drinkers)," ended a session of inebriation with Wright dying from being smitten with a shovel and Chapman "awaken[ing] to a
sense of the horrid deed he had perpetrated and to the inevitable
doom which awaits him."' 231 Sway Back was hung following conviction for killing one Murphy
with "a large oak stick" while in "a state
232
of extreme intoxication.
Alcohol abuse remains a serious topic today in Indian Country.23 3
In the lands of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the sale of
alcohol is still prohibited except on its casino property, although the
lure of the money it can fetch provides political pressure for its
allowance.2 34
The Cherokee Supreme Court addressed two alcohol cases. In the
first, Samuel Henry was convicted by the jury of selling spiritous liquor and fined one hundred dollars.2 35 In the second, Elijah Hicks, a
major figure in Cherokee history, was found guilty of purchasing spirits from a U.S. citizen and given the same fine, which was mandatory,
along with $6.00 in costs. 2 3 6 The fine was extracted from Mr. Hicks
the following year.23 7
Booze typically made its way into the Cherokee Nation via the
machinations of citizens of the U.S. Peddling liquor was only one of
many problems posed by United States citizens within the Cherokee
Nation. For example, George Harlan was fined $10.00 by the Supreme Court for hiring an American citizen.2 3 s
The Cherokee executive and legislative branches used the criminal
justice system to enforce a code of morality, including suppression of
"the great variety of vices emanating from dissipation, particularly
from intoxication and gaming at cards . .,239
In addition to its cases
229. Unknown Author, Unknown Title, CHEROKEE PHOENIX (New Echota), Sept. 17, 1828.
230. CHEROKEE PHOENIX (New Echota), Aug. 27, 1828.

231. Id.
232. CHEROKEE PHOENIX (New Echota), Apr. 24, 1828.

233. Scott McKie B.P., Alcohol Vote Could Occur as Early as June, THE CHEROKEE ONE
FEATHER (Cherokee), Dec. 24, 2008 at Al, A5.
234. Id.
235. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 21, 1825.
236. Id., at November 3, 1826; LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 104.
237. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 18, 1927.
238. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 22, 1829.
239. LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 26.
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regulating alcohol, on October 30, 1829, the Cherokee Supreme Court
was called upon to fine Thomas J. Pack for "gaming at cards." 2"
One case exemplifies the Cherokee's declining criminal jurisdiction
in favor of delivering a suspect to the custody of the United States
Agent where the United States had an over-arching interest-the alleged crime of counterfeiting U.S. bank notes.2 4 ' The Cherokees used
United States currency as their own.24 2 Swindlers, cheats and forgers
found their way into the Cherokee Nation with counterfeit
currency.243
Some of our neighbors have such a contemptible opinion of us, that
they must need not only abuse, but attempt to cheat us, by circulating
among us counterfeit money. Their failure in this piece of villainy,
however, proves their own ignorance. We have just seen one of these
men in the custody of a gentleman from Hightower-he has been arrested for having counterfeit bills. He no doubt, times being very hard
in Walton County, Georgia, came to make a fortune upon the ignorance of the Indians, for a large bundle (quite an unaccountable thing
these times) of these bills was found in his possession. But the Cherokees are not such fools as that comes to this man was found out in his
first attempt at speculation, and is now taken to the agent to receive
his reward.2 4"
Whether deferring a prosecution from the Tribal justice system for
prosecution in the courts of the United States was an exception or the
rule is difficult to know.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia demonstrates that the Cherokees were
well aware of, and sophisticated litigants within, the courts of the
United States. 45 Likewise, it is indisputable that the Secretary of
War, and thus the government of the United States,
was well aware of
246
the existence of the Cherokee Court system.
Not only was the government aware of the Cherokee Tribal Court,
its Agent sought the assistance of the Court and the sub-Agent appeared before it in the investigation of a criminal case in which a citizen of the United States claimed he was robbed by several
240. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 30, 1829; LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NA.
supra note 50, at 96 (noting that gaming at dice, roulette or thimbles was also prohibited).
241. CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIANS' ADVOCATE (New Echota), Feb. 24, 1830.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1.
246. On January 6, 1830, Agent Hugh Montgomery advised the Secretary of a claim by one
Henry Gill against the Cherokee Nation for the theft of money by some unknown Cherokee.
Included in the materials submitted were two depositions made by white men before "one of the
Indian Judges." Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 18241881, microformed on M-234, reel 74, at 212-13 (identifying letter from Indian Agent Montgomery to the Secretary of War, January 6, 1830).
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Cherokees.2 47 On April 11, 1829, Thomas Ligon was traveling on the
road from Alabama towards Georgia in a two horse carriage along
with a young slave.24 8 The road passed through the Cherokee Nation,
and in this place was a turnpike-a toll road.2 49 A heated dispute arose

between Mr. Ligon and a number of Cherokees, including one Captain White, regarding payment of the pikeage, or toll.25 ° When the
dispute ended, Mr. Ligon rode off in his wagon and sought refuge
nearby at the residence of one Jacob West, a white man, where he
reported that the Cherokees had stolen $1,500.00 from him, a very
large sum of cash for the times. 2 5 '
After taking Captain White's statement, Agent Montgomery sent a
memo to Judge John Martin, one of the original Judges of the Cherokee Supreme Court, asking that he "please lend his aid & influence"
in obtaining the return of the stolen money.2 52 The matter came
before Judge Walter Adair, another Cherokee Supreme Court Judge,
sitting as the Circuit Judge for the Hightower District of the Cherokee
Nation.2 53 On May 14, 1829, Judge Adair wrote a note that Captain
White had appeared and denied the crime, but since no Agent "or
other person for him" could attend, he deferred the investigation. 4
The case came back for investigation on September 17, 1829, at which
time Mr. William Thompson was present as "Agent for Co. Hugh

247. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microformed on M-234, reel 73, at 767-85 (identifying multiple court documents, including the
following: Cherokee Circuit Court records from the Hightower District, September 17, 1829;
Statement of Thomas Ligon to Agent Hugh Montgomery, April 16, 1829; Memorandum of
Agent Hugh Montgomery to Judge John Martin, April 16, 1829; Memorandum of Judge Walter
Adair, May 14, 1829; letter from _ Vann to Judge Walter Adair, September 16, 1829).
248. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microformed on M-234, reel 73, at 767-71 (letter identifying statement of Thomas Ligon to
Agent Hugh Montgomery, April 16, 1829).
249. Id.
250. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microformed on M-234, reel 73, at 767-85 (identifying multiple court documents, including the
following: Cherokee Circuit Court records from the Hightower District, September 17, 1829;
Statement of Thomas Ligon to Agent Hugh Montgomery, April 16, 1829; Memorandum of
Agent Hugh Montgomery to Judge John Martin, April 16, 1829; Memorandum of Judge Walter
Adair, May 14, 1829; letter from _ Vann to Judge Walter Adair, September 16, 1829).
251. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microformed on M-234, reel 73, at 767-71 (letter identifying statement of Thomas Ligon to
Agent Hugh Montgomery, April 16, 1829).
252. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microformed on M-234, reel 73, at 771 (citing from the Memorandum of Agent Hugh Montgomery to Judge John Martin, April 16, 1829).
253. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microformed on M-234, reel 73 (citing from the Memorandum of Judge Walter Adair, May 14,
1829).
254. Id.
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Montgomery. 2 5 5 Judge Adair then received testimony from Ah Da
Ka Ha Gee, Captain White and Black Fox.256 Each witness was then
questioned under oath in Court by Mr. Thompson.2 5 7
This striking case and the set of documents which memorialize it,
demonstrate that the Federal government was willing to use the re-

sources of the Tribal Courts, including the services of two Judges of
the Cherokee Supreme Court, to further the interests of the United
States. It demonstrates as well that the interests of the United States
and that of the Cherokee Judicial Branch coincided. Nothing about
the set of documents demonstrates that this "actual state of things, "258
agents of the Federal government seeking out and appearing before

Cherokee Supreme Court Judges in a criminal investigation where a
citizen of the United States was the alleged victim, was extraordinary.
Rather, documents in this case seem to be consistent stylistically with

other sworn statements preserved in the Court Minute Book. 59
On the frontier, access to the Courts of the United States might
involve a journey of days or even weeks. That agents of the United
States government would seek out respectable Cherokee Judges for

assistance in an urgent situation reflects the pragmatism of the frontier. But it reflects something else, too. This reaching out also under-

scores that, to the Indian Agent, the Cherokee Court system was
recognized as honorable and trustworthy. It also appears that its juris-

diction was satisfactory to the United States. If it were not, the
Agents would doubtless have turned elsewhere.
These actions on the part of the Agent of the United States were

not unique. As early as June of 1824, Agent McMinn advised the Secretary of War that he had turned a white man over to the Cherokee
Light Horse2 60 for criminal punishment.2 6 1 McMinn did not possess
255. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microformed on M-234, reel 73, at 774-85, 779 (citing from the Cherokee Circuit Court records
from the Hightower District, September 17, 1829).
256. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microformed on M-234, reel 73, at 774-85(citing from the Cherokee Circuit Court records from
the Hightower District, September 17, 1829).
257. Id.
258. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589.
259. Court Minute Book, supra note 60, at October 30, 1829.
260. The Cherokee Light Horse had existed since the turn of the 19th Century as a kind of
mobile police/paramilitary force. By the time of Agent McMinn's letter to the Secretary of War
the law provided for "one company of light-horse to accompany each circuit judge on his official
duties, in his respective districts, and to execute such punishment on thieves as the judges and
Council shall decide, agreeably to law...." CHEROKEE PHOENIX (New Echota), March 27, 1828;
THEDA PERDUE & MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE CHEROKEE NATION AND THE TRAIL OF TEARS 36
(2007).
261. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microforned on M-234, reel 71, at 260-66 (identifying the letter from Indian Agent McMinn to
the Secretary of War John Calhoun, June 9, 1824).
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sufficient evidence to bind the defendant, Daniel Rash, over for trial
in Knoxville on charges of accessory to robbery because two witnesses
would not leave the Cherokee Nation and be subjected to Court order
to attend in Knoxville.2 62
Stymied, McMinn
replied that Rash was a proper subject of their laws, and had a right to
receive the same penalties that would be inflicted on one of their own
proper for a similar offence, the Marshal then observed that by the
laws of the Cherokee Nation he would at least be whipped, and asked
if I would make any objections (sic) [Upon being told that the Agent]
would not, the light horse then agreed, and gave him so well as I recollect about 39 lashes laid on with a very tender hand as, I
understood.26 3
The significance of this incident should not be underestimated. The
Agent of the Secretary of War of the United States of America specifically transferred custody of a citizen of the United States to the Cherokee Nation for punishment for a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of the Cherokees.2 6 4 The Supreme Court of the United
States has yet to analyze Tribal Court criminal jurisdiction in conjunction with this evidence from the historical record.2 6 5
ANALYSIS

Although this paper is an historical survey, its topic is as current as
today's headlines. Today's judiciary struggles with many of the same
issues; in particular, whom does the judicial system serve? As a function of Tribal self-determination, the restraints on Tribal exercise of
criminal jurisdiction hinder the sovereign functions of the Indian Nations.26 6 One scholar has construed an aspect of these restraints, the
Major Crimes Act, 267 as an example of "'colonization"' and called for
the Act's repeal.26 8
262. Id.
263. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microformed on M-234, reel 71, at 260-66, 263 (identifying the letter from Indian Agent McMinn
to the Secretary of War John Calhoun, June 9, 1824); One of the Marshal's duties was "to execute the decisions of the judges in their respective districts." See generally CHEROKEE PHOENIX
(New Echota), March 27, 1828.
264. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East, 1824-1881,
microformed on M-234, reel 71, at 260-66 (identifying the letter from Indian Agent McMinn to
the Secretary of War John Calhoun, June 9, 18).
265. See Johnson, 21 U.S. 543; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556; Talton, 163 U.S. 376; Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191; Duro, 496 U.S. 676 ; Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1;
Lara, 541 U.S. 193; Montana, 450 U.S. 544; Strate, 520 U.S. 438; Nevada, 533 U.S. 353; Plains
Commerce Bank, _
U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 2709.
266. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L.
REv. 779 (2006).
267. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
268. Washburn, supra note 266, at 842-849.
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Full criminal jurisdiction encompasses the ability of a tribunal to
exercise jurisdiction over people (and subject matter) who allegedly
commit crimes within a certain territory or enclave. 26 9 Today, as a
result of Oliphant and its progeny, Tribal Courts do not possess full
criminal jurisdiction. 270 Lack of full criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country today "effectively denies the Indian community
an important
271
outlet for self-determination and self definition.
The creation of the Cherokee Constitution of 1827 was nothing less
than an act of self-determination and self definition. The original
Cherokee Court system was clearly intended to possess full criminal
jurisdiction. 72 Article V, Section 8 of the Cherokee Constitution of
1827 was explicit in that regard: "The Judges of the Supreme Court
and Circuit Courts shall have comple[te] criminal Jurisdiction in such
cases and in such manner as may be pointed out by law."' 273 So were
other laws: the District Court "shall have complete criminal jurisdiction, (except in cases of murder)...
Certain laws passed by the National Council specifically criminalized the behavior of white people, i.e. United States citizens.2 75 For
instance it was a crime for white persons who were not citizens of the
Cherokee Nation to bring spiritous liquor into the Nation. 276 Similarly, a white man who married
a "negro woman slave" within the
2 77
Nation was subject to flogging.
As we have seen, Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Tennessee, attempted to and occasionally succeeded in imposing their criminal jurisdiction over Cherokees for actions allegedly occurring within the
Cherokee Nation during this period. 78 However, exclusive jurisdiction is not the same as full jurisdiction. No State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction even today-the Federal government exercises jurisdiction in each State. 279 Those States with Tribal Courts or reservations
do not have full jurisdiction over Indian Country, even in those Tribal

269. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556.
270. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.
271. Washburn, supra note 266, at 842.
272. LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 50, at 127.

273. Id.
274. Id. at 97.
275. Id. at 39.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 38.
278. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18;
Tenn. 256.
279. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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areas covered by P.L. 83-280,28 0 where the States have criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian Country.2 l
The revelation that the Cherokee Nation exercised complete criminal jurisdiction over its territory prior to removal presents an opportunity for a re-appraisal of the very bedrock assumptions of Oliphant in
light of the existing historical record. The operation of the Tribal
Court during this time period provoked an outraged response from
the State of Georgia, and no doubt was one of the many impetuses for
the ultimate removal of the Cherokee Nation.2 82 Still, the historical
record contains a number of definitive examples of the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over citizens of the United States by the Cherokee Nation during the period 1823 to 1835.
The Cherokee Nation's exercise of criminal jurisdiction was consistent with the dependent status of the Cherokee Nation as it was explained by the Supreme Court of the United States in Cherokee

Nation v. Georgia.283 The "actual state of things '284 as revealed by the
Court Minute Book and other historical records is not so cut and
dried as Oliphant presumes.285 The Cherokee Supreme Court stood
at the pinnacle of a vibrant and robust judicial branch of government,
marked by appropriate protections of due process and judicial review.
By acknowledging and participating in the Cherokee Tribal Courts, by
handing a United States citizen over to authorized agents of the
Courts of the Cherokee Nation, the Agents of the United States conferred the imprimatur of legitimacy upon the criminal proceedings occurring within the Cherokee Nation. These acts of legitimization are
'
powerful evidence of the "actual state of things."286
The "actual state
2 87
'
of things
included the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over citizens
of the United States. 88

280. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000 & Supp. 2004); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2000 & Supp. 2003); 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
281. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
282. "Jurisdictional issues regarding the authority of the state to retrieve fugitive or stolen
slaves or alleged fugitive criminals within Cherokee territory became more threatening to neighboring states after the creation of the Cherokee Supreme Court and the adoption of a constitution which declared the Cherokee to be a sovereign, independent government with jurisdiction
over its own lands." PELTIER, supra note 72, at 162.
283. Although the Supreme Court of the United States never reached the ultimate question
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia as to the legality of Georgia's brazen attempt to enforce its
criminal laws it nevertheless observed that "[in] considering this subject, the habits and usages of
the Indians, in their intercourse with their white neighbours, ought not to be entirely disregarded." Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18. This hearkens back to the "actual state of things" of
Johnson v. M'Intosh. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589.
284. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589.
285. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191,
286. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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The historical foundations of Oliphant are suspect, at best, and
should be reevaluated in the light of the operation of the Supreme
Court of the Cherokee Nation. The following question should be
presented to the Supreme Court of the United States: Consistent with
their dependent status, do the Cherokee Indians retain the sovereign
power, which they previously exercised, to try and punish non-Indian
citizens of the United States for violations of their laws?
At this time, there are 564 federally recognized Indian Tribes.2 8 9
What is consistent with one Tribe's dependent status may be very different from the nature of the retained sovereignty of another.29 ° Yet
in Oliphant, the Supreme Court of the United States painted with a
broad brush, flatly denying Tribal Court criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians in a conclusion binding upon each of the Indian Nations.2 9 1 Oliphantthen treats all Indian Tribes, no matter how different, no matter how tangled their histories are with the government of
the United States, in the same rigid way.292
Data which suggest the kinds of jurisdiction retained by one Tribe
might assist in similar assessments of the judicial powers of others. If
the Supreme Court of the United States comes to recognize "the actual state of things '2 93 in light of the operation of the original Cherokee Supreme Court and its constituent tribunals, then the "current
state of affairs '294 might be adjusted accordingly to permit the exercise of full criminal jurisdiction within the Cherokees' spheres of Indian Country. This can lead to a comparison with the legal history of
other Indian Tribes-the Navajos and Choctaws are prime candidates.
In this way, the unique primary materials left by the Cherokee Judges
of the early 19th Century will continue to reverberate.
Perhaps the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by some Tribes might
be inconsistent with their dependent status at this time. Nevertheless,
the historical record suggests that the time has come for another look
at Oliphant, at least in the light of Cherokee Tribal Court jurisdiction.

289. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Services Overview, http://www.bia.gov/WhatWeDo/Service
Overview/index.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
290. "Each tribe has a unique relationship with the United States, often reflected in particular treaties or statutes. Thus, the law affecting one tribe may not necessarily affect all tribes. On
the other hand, federal policy and laws too often have treated tribes as if they were all the
same." COHEN, supra note 15, at 2.
291. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.
292. Id.
293. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589.
294. April 4, 1990 Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr., regarding Duro v. Reina, No. 88-6546, in Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (reproduced
from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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Originally designed as "an instrument... to serve the needs of the
small group of wealthy '295 Cherokees, the Cherokee Tribal Court system and the Constitution that incorporated the Court into the fabric
of a new American Indian Republic, swiftly grew into something
more, both symbolic and significant: "a token of nationalistic defiance-and it probably contributed greatly to an increased resolution
on the part of surrounding state governments to remove the Indians." 296 It also grew into an idea-that Indian Tribes can maintain
fully operational and respected judicial systems and that justice in Indian Country, as understood by Westerners, can be a reality. Ideas
are hard to kill.
The fact that the Cherokee Supreme Court operated at all is extremely significant, regardless of broader concerns. That it continued
cases, adjudicated hog stealing, inquired into the circumstances of
convicted murderers and redressed wrongs demonstrates conclusively
that, within their dependent status, the Cherokees historically and successfully operated a constitutionally based judicial branch of government, topped by a Supreme Court whose measured actions disclose
the hands of jurists engaging the levers of sovereignty. The legacy of
those judges continues today among the Tribal Court judges and justices in Tahlequah, Oklahoma and Cherokee, North Carolina.

295. STRICKLAND, supra note 19, at 73.
296. MALONE supra note 70, at 84.
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